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A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil
Litigation in the Federal Courts:
The Special Jury
Rita Suttont
If you can find a jury that's both a computer technician,
a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I
think you could have a qualified jury, but we don't know
anything about that.
-Foreman of deadlocked jury's response to judge's in-
quiry as to whether such a complex antitrust case
should ever be submitted to a jury.* ,
In recent years, there has been much concern 'over the jury's
ability to comprehend and decide complex civil issues; especially in
the areas of antitrust, securities, and patents.' The economic and
scientific concepts necessary to understand such cases are often
outside the scope of the typical juror's experience and competence.
Special juries, chosen for their particular knowledge or experience,2
could help eliminate these current problems of jury confusion and
lead to better decisions.
Despite the potential benefits that special juries can bring to
complex civil litigation, such juries are nonetheless open to attack
on both constitutional and statutory grounds. Part I of this Com-
ment provides background information on the problems facing ju-
t B.A. 1987, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. Candidate 1991, University
of Chicago.
* ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v International Business Machines Corp., 458 F
Supp 423, 447 (ND Cal 1978) (quoting from transcript at 19,548).
' See, for example, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92
Harv L Rev 898 (1979); Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commer-
cial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 Conn L Rev 775 (1978).
2 The special juries advocated in this Comment are not expert panels. For example, in a
complex patent law case, the type of jury proposed here would not be composed solely of
persons with doctoral degrees in engineering. The potential problems and advantages of
such panels, while providing ample opportunity for discussion, see E. Donald Elliott, To-
ward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69
BU L Rev 487, 504-05 (1989), do not provide the focus here. Rather, this Comment advo-
cates the selection of jurors who are more likely to have some minimal level of knowledge
relating to the relevant field.
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ries today in complex civil cases and illustrates some historical uses
of special juries in England and America. Part II discusses consti-
tutional and statutory challenges to the use of special juries in
complex civil litigation and argues that these challenges are un-
sound. Part III analyzes various proposals for the implementation
of a special jury system in the federal courts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Jury Confusion in Complex Cases
Juries in complex civil proceedings may find themselves faced
with trials lasting weeks or months, with tens or hundreds of ex-
pert and non-expert witnesses, and with thousands of pages of doc-
uments.3 A satisfactory evaluation of the evidence must in many
instances be beyond the capabilities of even the most dedicated
traditional jury. For example, in one antitrust case the jury became
hopelessly deadlocked after being confronted with advanced com-
puter technology, complex economic analysis, and the testimony of
87 witnesses during the 96 trial days.4 Similarly, a demand for jury
trial was denied in an antitrust case in which a nine-year discovery
period had produced millions of documents, trial was expected to
last one year, and jurors would have been required to analyze Jap-
anese market conditions and business practices over a thirty-year
period and to make price comparisons of thousands of electronic
products based upon their marketability, performance and cost of
production.'
B. Exclusion of the Educated
It is in this type of case that jurors chosen for their special
experience or educational competence would be most helpful.
Studies have indicated that better educated people score higher on
tests evaluating comprehension of jury instructions. Strawn and
Buchanan, in their evaluations of juror understanding, determined
that "those jurors with some previous college experience tended to
score higher after receiving instructions than those without college
3 See, for example, Comment, 10 Conn L Rev at 784-85, for a description of the obsta-
cles confronting one jury in a complex antitrust and patent case.
ILC Peripherals, 458 F Supp at 444.
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F2d 1069, 1073-74 (3rd
Cir 1980).
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experience." 8 Although these studies concerned primarily juror
evaluation of standard jury instructions in criminal trials, there is
no reason to doubt that the same results would follow in civil
litigation.
The demands that would be made on a special juror are in
some respects similar to those placed on a college student.7 Oral
presentations supplemented by visual displays are used to convey
information in both the courtroom and the college classroom.8 Like
a college student, a special juror must first learn and then apply
relatively complicated principles.' Mathematics, accounting, eco-
nomics, and science are fields that often confuse jurors in complex
cases; college graduates (as well as those with special training or
experience in a related area) are more apt to have some general
background in these fields.10
Despite the potential usefulness of technical or economic
knowledge in jury deliberations, there is evidence that trial lawyers
use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with specialized
knowledge. Lawyers may fear that educated jurors would see
through a weak case, or would use their education and experience
to sway other panel members." One lawyer has asserted that the
defense in an antitrust case is more prone to challenge the inclu-
sion of educated persons on the jury than is the plaintiff. 2
Moreover, many educated persons are often excused from jury
service for cause.' 3 In addition to exempting employees of fire and
6 David U. Strawn and Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,
59 Judicature 478, 483 (May 1976). See also Laurence J. Severance, Edith Greene and Eliza-
beth F. Loftus, Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors Can Understand, 75 J Crim
L & Criminol 198, 224 (1984) ("[Jlurors with greater experience and learning apparently
comprehend and apply jury instructions better than those who are less experienced and/or
less well educated."); Robert P. Charrow and Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 Colum L Rev 1306,
1320-21 (1979) ("[Tlhe only factor that consistently and significantly correlated with per-
formance was the amount of education that a subject had had .... [C]omprehension rose as
education level rose.").
William V. Luneburg and Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Ex-
pert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil
Litigation, 67 Va L Rev 887, 947-48 (1981).
8 Id at 948.
Id at 947.
10 Id at 948.
11 Comment, 10 Conn L Rev at 780-81 (cited in note 1).
11 Frederick P. Furth and Robert Emmett Burns, The Anatomy of a Seventy Million
Dollar Sherman Act Settlement-A Law Professor's Tape-Talk with Plaintiff's Trial
Counsel, 23 DePaul L Rev 865, 880-81 (1974).
" See, for example, Comment, 10 Conn L Rev at 779-80.
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police departments and certain public officials from jury service,"
the federal Jury Selection and Service Act 5 gives district courts
discretion to specify those groups whose members shall be excused
from jury service upon a showing of "undue hardship or extreme
inconvenience." 6 .District courts have responded by excusing doc-
tors, dentists, lawyers and other professionals on a routine basis, a
practice upheld as constitutional. 7 Furthermore, people who hold
scientific, management, and supervisory positions often cannot af-
ford to abandon their work for the weeks or months necessary for
the presentation of a complex case.' 8
Because of factors such as these, juries in complex cases tend
to include a low percentage of persons with higher education or
relevant experience. For example, in a complicated case involving
alleged patent and antitrust violations, all 22 prospective jurors
with an occupation deemed relevant to the litigation were excused
for cause.'9 Similarly, in ILC Peripherals,0 an antitrust case in-
volving a computer systems manufacturer, only one juror had any
technical education, several were homemakers, one was retired,
and the remaining employed jurors had jobs that permitted their
temporary replacement so that neither their jobs nor incomes were
at risk.2 The judge commented that
[t]he 11 jurors to whom this case was submitted probably
represented a random cross-section of people in the com-
munity who could afford to spend 10 months serving on a
jury, but it is open to question whether they were a true
cross-section of the community.2 2
Rather than selecting juries who are more likely to understand to-
day's complex civil cases, the current system makes it less likely
that the better educated citizen will serve.
" 28- USC § 1863(b)(6) (1988).
" 28 USC §§ 1861-74 (1988).
'a 28 USC § 1863(b)(5).
17 See, for example, United States v Van Scoy, 654 F2d 257, 262-63 (3rd Cir 1981);
United States v Goodlaw, 597 F2d 159, 161 (9th Cir 1979).
" Nor is it economically feasible; employers often limit an employee's pay while on jury
duty to four weeks or less. Comment, 10 Conn L Rev at 777 (cited in note 1).
"S Id at 780, discussing SCM Corp. v Xerox Corp., 463 F Supp 983 (D Conn 1978).
"0 458 F Supp 423.
" Id at 448.
' Id.
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C. Special Juries in History
Special juries are not a modern concept. In one sense, all juries
were "special" at the inception of the jury trial: In the fourteenth
century, it was presumed that jurors knew the facts of the dispute
at hand since they were purposely chosen from the vicinity in
which the conflict arose. 3 Jurors were expected to be active inves-
tigators and participants in the adjudicative process, not mere pas-
sive evaluators of evidence presented by others.24
Historically, special juries chosen for their knowledge or expe-
rience took many forms. Consider the following examples. In 1394,
a special jury of cooks and fishmongers was assembled in a case
alleging the sale of bad food. 5 From the fourteenth through the
seventeefith centuries, the English employed juries composed
solely of clerks and lawyers to evaluate accusations of corruption
by public officials. 6-
Special juries composed solely of "matrons" (married or wid-
owed women who had some experience with pregnancy) were used
in England throughout the seventeenth century when a woman
convicted of a capital crime asserted that she was pregnant.2 7
These all-female juries were instructed to examine a defendant and
determine whether she was pregnant. If so, the defendant's execu-
tion was stayed until after the birth of the child. If the matrons
found no evidence of pregnancy, the execution proceeded as sched-
uled. 8 While matrons were selected partly for reasons of privacy,
they were used primarily because they were considered experts in
the area of childbirth. 9
Merchant courts reached their heyday in England in the eight-
eenth century. 0 In these tribunals, special juries of merchants, se-
lected precisely because of their special knowledge and experience
with trade customs, helped explain and formulate the principles of
English commercial law.'
2" James C. Oldham, The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U Chi L Rev 137, 164 (1983).
24 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 Am J
Legal Hist 313, 314 (1973).
2" Oldham, 50 U Chi L Rev at 174.
26 Id at 174-75.
27 Id at 171-72.
28 Id at 171.
29 Id at 171-72.
30 Luneburg & Nordenberg, 67 Va L Rev at 903 (cited in note 7).
"' Oldham, 50 U Chi L Rev at 173-74. The English historical illustrations above are not
quite analogous to the special juries advocated in this Comment. The illustrations are more
closely akin to expert panels which could prove problematic in complex cases. For example,
an expert panel of economists presiding over a complex antitrust case may lead to a spirited
5751
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Special or "blue-ribbon" juries were also used in the United
States in various forms through the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury,32 after which they fell into disuse. Until the 1960's, New York
employed special juries upon the motion of either party if the im-
portance or intricacy of the case seemed to justify a specially se-
lected factfinding tribunal.33 The Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the New York special jury selection process in Fay
v New York, 4 remarking that
[e]ach of the grounds of elimination is reasonably and
closely related to the juror's suitability for the kind of
service the special panel requires or to his fitness to judge
the kind of cases for which it is most frequently
utilized. 5
Special juries have recently been revived in Delaware."0 The
current Delaware special jury statute permits the use of special ju-
ries, though only in complex civil cases. 37 While the United States
Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality of this
statute, the highest court in Delaware upheld an earlier similar
statute under both the state and federal constitutions.3 "
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CHALLENGES TO THE USE
OF SPECIAL JURIES
Federal cases have not addressed the prospect of amending
the current federal jury system to permit special juries in complex
civil litigation. There has, however, been much discussion of sub-
debate on the underlying theory of antitrust law rather than a decision on the facts of the
case.
32 See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 Iowa L Rev 409,
409-10 (1950).
a 1938 NY Laws Ch 552, Art 18-B at 1488 (Apr 7, 1938) (repealed 1965).
s 332 US 261 (1947). See also Moore v New York, 333 US 565 (1948).
Fay, 332 US at 270.
36 10 Del Code Ann § 4506 (Supp 1988).
10 Del Code Ann § 4506 provides in pertinent part: "The Court may order a special
jury upon the application of any party in a complex civil case." It is significant that Dela-
ware, the state of incorporation for an overwhelming number of large business firms, has
enacted such a statute. In order to maintain its profitable position as corporate favorite,
Delaware must remain responsive to corporate legal needs. See Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J L Econ & Org 225, 240-42 (1985).
Large corporations are very often parties in complex civil cases.
" Nance v Rees, 52 Del 533, 161 A2d 795 (1960); Haas v United Technologies Corp.,
450 A2d 1173 (Del 1982). See also In re Asbestos Litigation, 551 A2d 1296 (Del 1988). The
previous Delaware statute provided: "A special jury for the trial of a cause, shall be ordered
by the Court upon the application of either party." 10 Del Code Ann § 4541 (1974) (repealed
in 1987).
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stituting bench for jury trials in this type of litigation. This substi-
tution poses some of the same constitutional issues as the special
jury-for example, whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees
the right to a jury in complex civil litigation. A discussion of the
relevant constitutional issues and case law in this area is under-
taken in section A. Assuming for present purposes that jury trials
are constitutionally mandated in complex civil litigation, section A
proposes that the Seventh Amendment can be liberally construed
to allow for the use of special juries in such cases.
The Supreme Court has determined that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial in criminal cases"9 incorporates a right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.40 The Court
has not conclusively addressed whether the Seventh Amendment
imposes the same cross-section requirement in civil cases.4 1 This
fact, coupled with the Court's holding that the Seventh Amend-
ment-unlike the Sixth Amendment-is not essential to due pro-
cess and is therefore inapplicable to the states,42 may indicate that
Sixth Amendment standards are stricter. 3
Even if the Constitution does not impose a fair cross-section
requirement in civil jury trials, Congress has done so for federal
cases. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act explicitly re-
quires jury selection from a fair cross-section of the community in
civil as well as criminal cases." Section B concludes that special
juries would not run afoul of either the statutory fair cross-section
requirement or the Equal Protection Clause.
" The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.
40 Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 527 (1975).
41 But see Colgrove v Battin, 413 US 149, 160 n 16 (1973), a civil case in which the
Court noted "[wihat is required for a 'jury' is a number large enough to facilitate group
deliberation combined with a likelihood of obtaining a representative cross section of the
community," citing Williams v Florida, 399 US 78, 100 (1970).
42 Contrast Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), with Walker v Sauvinet, 92 US 90 (1875)
(Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to states).
11 See Colgrove, 413 US at 170 (Marshall dissenting) ("[I1t still does not follow that the
definitions of trial by jury for purposes of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments are necessa-
rily coextensive. The two Amendments use different language and they guarantee different
rights.").
" 28 USC § 1861 provides, in pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from
a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.
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A. Seventh Amendment Challenges
1. Historical Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.
The Seventh Amendment45 has consistently been interpreted
in light of the English common law as it existed in 1791, when the
amendment was adopted."" By its own terms, the amendment
"preserve[s]" the right to jury trial only in cases then heard "at
common law." In other cases, such as those within the exclusive
equitable province of the Chancery, or those involving rights cre-
ated since 1791, the amendment does not apply. 7
A persuasive argument has been made that in 1791 there sim-
ply were no complex trials of the sort heard by courts today. Most
multi-party, multi-issue suits were heard at equity in 1791.48 Since
such cases were not heard at law, the Seventh Amendment does
not "preserve", a right to jury trial in complex litigation today.4
Even if special juries violate the Seventh Amendment-which is
far from clear 50-they thus could ,be employed in complex cases,
where the Seventh Amendment does not apply.
2. The Complexity Exception.
While the right to a jury trial for complex *civil litigation is, at
best, questionable at common law, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that it might sanction a complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial. In Ross v Bernhard,51 the Supreme
Court almost surreptitiously opened the door to furious specula-
tion about the future of the right to trial by jury.52 In the so-called
" The full text of the Seventh Amendment to the United' States Constitution is:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
6 United States v Wonson, 28 F Cases 745, 750 (Cir Ct D Mass 1812); Dimick v
Schiedt, 293 US 474, 476 (1935).
11 Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L J 655, 655-56
(1963).
Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 51 U Chi L Rev 581, 603-06 (1984).
'9 Id at 608-13. The Comment'concludes that bench trials are therefore constitutionally
permissible in complex litigation.
See Sections II.B.2, 3 and 4 of this Comment.
396 US 531 (1970).
5' See, for example, Note, Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh
Amendment, 81 Yale L J 112 (1971); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil
Litigation, 92 Harv L Rev 898 (1979). But compare Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 Mich L Rev 68, 76-80 (1981).
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"Ross footnote," the Court, after describing the distinction be-
tween law and equity, said
the "legal" nature of an issue is determined by consider-
ing, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. 3
No authority was cited for this third proposition, and whether or
not it endorses a complexity exception to traditional jury trial has
been much debated.
Since Ross, the circuits have split over the constitutionality of
a complexity exception. The Ninth Circuit has staunchly applied
the Seventh Amendment's literal guarantee of trial by jury to com-
plex cases, 4 noting that "it is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would attempt to make such a radical departure from its prior in-
terpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote."55 The
Third Circuit, however, denied a request for jury trial in a complex
antitrust case for reasons of complexity. 6 The complexity issue has
also been addressed a number of times by district courts with vary-
ing results. 57
Recently, the Supreme Court appeared to confirm the Ninth
Circuit's suspicion that no complexity exception was established by
the Ross footnote, but continued to confine its discussion of the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries" to footnotes. In Tull v
United States,58 the Court intimated that inquiry into jury capa-
bilities should be made only in considering the applicability of the
Seventh Amendment to administrative law courts.59 That inquiry
focuses on the functional capabilities of the jury mechanism rather
than the capabilities of individual jurors. This interpretation was
made more explicit in Granfinanciera, S.A. v Nordberg,0 which
noted that the proper role of a jury within the context of adminis-
" Ross, 396 US at 538 n 10.
" In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F2d 411 (9th Cir 1979).
" Id at 425.
" In re Japanese Electronic Products, 631 F2d at 1069. For further discussion of the
complexity of this case, see text accompanying note 5.
" See, for example, ILC Peripherals, 458 F Supp 423; Bernstein v Universal Pictures,
Inc., 79 FRD 59 (SDNY 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F Supp 99 (WD
Wash 1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F Supp 889 (ED Pa
1979), vacated as In re Japanese Electronic Products, 631 F2d 1069.
" 107 S Ct 1831 (1987).
' Id at 1835 n 4 ("The Court has also considered the practical limitations of a jury trial
and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law in
holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings.").
60 109 S Ct 2782 (1989).
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trative proceedings "appears to be what the Court contemplated
when in Ross v Bernhard it identified 'the practical abilities and
limitations of juries' as an additional factor to be consulted in de-
termining whether the Seventh Amendment confers a jury trial
right.""1
The Court's alternate explanation of the Ross footnote may
indicate that it is unwilling to sanction any complexity exception
to the Seventh Amendment. Yet, while the administrative proceed-
ing explanation for Ross appears plausible, the Court relies upon
no cases prior to Ross to support such a reading. 2 Furthermore, if
the Court is firmly opposed to a complexity exception, one must
question why it has not addressed this important issue directly and
has opted instead to skirt the issue. 3 Thus, despite the virtual
elimination of Ross as a possible sanction for a complexity excep-
tion, it is still not altogether certain that the Supreme Court would
directly condemn such an exception.
It has been asserted that without a complexity exception the
Seventh Amendment and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion would conflict with one another.6 ' The Supreme Court has
read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment" to insure
that a litigant will present his case to "a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it."66 In a complex
case, where the average juror is unable to fully comprehend the
evidence before him, must the Seventh Amendment yield to the
due process requirement of a fair and impartial trial? This di-
lemma presents itself only if the Seventh Amendment is narrowly
construed to require that juries be chosen without regard to educa-
tion or experience. But the Seventh Amendment has not been, and
should not be, interpreted this narrowly.
61 Id at 2790 n 4 (citation omitted).
62 See Comment, Extra judicial Adjudication and the Right to Jury Trial: The Impact
of Granfinanciera v Nordberg, 1990 U Chi Legal F 479, for the observation that both the
Tull and Granfinanciera footnotes cite Atlas Roofing Co. v Occupational Safety & Health
Rev. Comm'n, 430 US 442 (1977), as precedent for the focus on administrative proceedings.
This case was decided seven years after Ross, a fact which casts doubt on the explanation
that administrative courts were the initial motivation for the third prong of the Ross test.
63 This argument adopts the logic of the Ninth Circuit (see notes 54-55 and accompany-
ing text), in its refusal to view the Ross footnote as authority for a complexity exception in
the first place. But in light of the uproar which followed Ross (see notes 54-61 and accompa-
nying text), the final resolution of the complexity issue seems to have risen above footnote
status.
64 See, for example, In re Japanese Electronic Products, 631 F2d at 1084.
6' "[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." US Const, Amend V.
66 Smith v Phillips, 455 US 209, 217 (1982).
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3. Modifications of the Traditional Jury.
In Colgrove v Battin 7 the Supreme Court emphasized that
the Seventh Amendment does not offer absolute protection to the
traditional form of the jury:
We can only conclude ... that by referring to the "com-
mon law," the Framers of the Seventh Amendment were
concerned with preserving the right of trial by jury in
civil cases where it existed at common law, rather than
the various incidents of trial by jury. 8
In upholding the constitutionality of a six-member civil jury, as
opposed to the traditional jury of twelve, the Court embraced the
idea that "[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the ancient institu-
tion to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in
the administration of justice."69 The demands of today's complex
civil trials70 indicate that some adaptation may now be necessary
to maintain the jury's position as an effective factfinder. The intro-
duction of specially educated or experienced juries in complex civil
litigation could similarly transform the jury into a more "efficient
instrument in the administration of justice" by insuring better
comprehension of the evidence and issues.
Better educated and experienced juries would be more recep-
tive to the issues in complex litigation without impairing the sub-
stance of the common law right to jury trial. Special juries would
adequately fulfill the acknowledged purpose of civil jury trials: "to
assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues. 71 At the
same time, many of the benefits of collective decisionmaking, in-
cluding group memory and a diversity of viewpoints 7 2 would re-
main intact.
4. Delaware's Response to Constitutional Challenge.
The Supreme Court of Delaware has repeatedly upheld the
Delaware special jury statute 7 against attacks on federal and state
constitutional grounds. In Nance v Rees, 4 the Delaware Supreme
67 413 US 149 (1973).
68 Id at 155-56 (emphasis in original). See also Galloway v United States, 319 US 372,
392 (1943) ("[Tlhe (Seventh] Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of
jury trial in only its most fundamental elements.").
6' Colgrove, 413 US at 157, quoting from Ex parte Peterson, 253 US 300, 309-10 (1920).
To See text accompanying note 49.
71 Colgrove, 413 US at 157.
71 Lempert, 80 Mich L Rev at 91 (cited in note 52).
7. 10 Del Code Ann § 4506.
7' 52 Del 533, 161 A2d 795 (1960).
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Court rejected the charge that the special jury statute75 violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
relied primarily on an historical argument in defending the statute,
tracing the development of the special jury through the state's
history.a
In Haas v United Technologies Corp.,7 the Delaware Su-
preme Court addressed due process and equal protection chal-
lenges in the context of complex civil litigation. Emphasizing that
the Constitution forbids only intentional or purposeful exclusion of
an identifiable group, the court held that the evidence did not
show any violation of constitutional rights." The court did note,
however, that the jury commissioners' vague guidelines created the
potential for abuse in the selection of special jury pools. 79 Using its
power to supervise state judicial administration and to promulgate
rules of procedure under Delaware law, the court directed the
lower courts to formulate a scheme of more detailed criteria and
guidelines for the selection of special jury pools.8 0 In drafting this
scheme, the court emphasized "the twin goals of achieving a fair
representation of the community on the jury panel while providing
for intelligent, educated and competent jurors for the adjudication
of complex cases." 81
In 1987, the Delaware legislature replaced the special jury
statute at issue in Nance and Haas with a statute providing for
special juries at the discretion of the court "upon application of
any party in a complex civil case."' 82 The court in In re Asbestos
Litigation's affirmed the legitimacy of this statute under the state
constitutional provision that "[tirial by jury shall be as hereto-
7' 10 Del Code Ann § 4541(a) (1974) (repealed in 1987), provided that "[a] special jury
for the trial of a cause, shall be ordered by the Court upon the application of either party."
This statute was tlhe forerunner of the current Delaware special jury statute, 10 Del Code
Ann § 4506.
" Nance, 161 A2d at 798-99.
" 450 A2d 1173 (Del 1982).
78 Id at 1184.
" Commissioners generally "elected to use education and age as their criteria," and
"selected persons with more than 12 years of formal education and intentionally avoided
selecting persons either in their twenties or seventies." Id (quoting affidavit of Superior
Court Administrator).
" Id at 1185.
,Id.
88 10 Del Code Ann § 4506. This newer statute limits the applicability of special juries
to complex cases, and gives the trial court discretion in determining whether the use of such
a panel is warranted: "The Court may order a 'special jury upon the application of any' party
in a complex civil case." (Emphasis added).
" 551 A2d 1296 (Del Super 1988).
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fore."'8 4  Although federal constitutional challenges were not
presented in this case, the court relied heavily on Nance and Haas.
B. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement and the Equal
Protection Clause
1. The Less Educated as a Cognizable Group.
Proponents of special juries must deal with the plain language
of the federal Jury Selection and Service Act:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by' jury shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a
fair cross-section of the community."
The statute's "plain language" does suggest that special juries
would be impermissible because they would exclude the less edu-
cated from jury service, thus eliminating a significant section of the
community. A considerable body of case law has developed, how-
ever, defining what constitutes a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity. These decisions show that special juries would not violate the
fair cross-section requirement by discriminating against the less
educated.
The Supreme Court has outlined a test to establish the exis-
tence of a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's cross-
section requirement. 6 A defendant must show 1) that the group
alleged to have been excluded forms a "distinctive" group in the
community, 2) that the group's under-representation in the pool
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable, and 3)
that this under-representation results from a systematic exclusion
of the group.
The Supreme Court has never defined "distinctive,"'87 but the
federal courts have identified some characteristics of a "distinc-
tive" or "cognizable" group. To qualify as "distinctive," a group
should evidence internal cohesion:
84 Del Const Art I, § 4 (1897).
88 28 USC § 1861.
88 Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364 (1979), explaining Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US
522 (1975). For a discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section
requirement to the Seventh Amendment, see section II.A of this Comment.
87 Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 174 (1986) ("We have never attempted to precisely
define the term 'distinctive group.' "); United States v Potter, 552 F2d 901, 903 (9th Cir
1977) ("A precise definition of what constitutes a cognizable group is lacking in the decided
cases.").
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There must be a common thread which runs through the
group, a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas ... which
cannot be adequately represented if the group is ex-
cluded from the jury selection process .... [T~he group
must have a community of interest which cannot be ade-
quately protected by the rest of the populace."8
Recognition of the class by the larger community as an identi-
fiable group is likewise important.89 Evidence of community dis-
crimination or prejudice would provide ample support for the pro-
position that the group is sufficiently distinctive for purposes of
the fair-cross section requirement.9 0
In light of the above considerations, challenges to the fair
cross-section requirement have focused almost exclusively on is-
sues of age, race, and gender.9 " There is, however, one very notable
exception to this general trend: challenges to the systematic elimi-
nation for cause of the so-called "Witherspoon excludables." 2 The
Supreme Court has approved the removal for cause in death pen-
alty cases of prospective jurors who are morally opposed to the
death penalty and who are unable to put aside their convictions in
order to apply the law. 3 It is presumed that one who cannot over-
come his moral objections to capital punishment would be substan-
tially impaired in the performance of his duties as a juror.9 4 In
Lockhart v McCree, the Court held this group is insufficiently
"distinctive" for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. 5
Unlike the systematic elimination of jurors solely on the basis
of race or gender, the exclusion of the less educated in complex
cases would be related to their ability to perform as jurors in spe-
" United States v Guzman, 337 F Supp 140, 143-44 (SDNY 1972), aff'd, 468 F2d 1245
(2nd Cir 1972).
" Cobbs v Robinson, 528 F2d 1331, 1336-37 (2d Cir 1975).
90 See, for example, Hernandez v Texas, 347 US 475, 479 (1954).
" See, for example, Hamling v United States, 418 US 87 (1974) (young adults not
shown to constitute a distinctive group); Duren, 439 US 357 (systematic exclusion of women
from jury service unconstitutional); Hobby v United States, 468 US 339 (1984) (purposeful
exclusion of women and blacks from position as grand jury foreman unconstitutional); Cas-
taneda v Partida, 430 US 482 (1977) (exclusion of Mexican-Americans from grand jury un-
constitutional). But see also Thiel v Southern Pacific Co., 328 US 217 (1946) (jury lacking
blue-collar workers deemed unrepresentative of the community).
2 The term derives from Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510 (1968). In this capital
case, the Supreme Court evaluated the defendant's claim that the removal for cause of all
potential jurors who voiced any objection to the death penalty violated his constitutional
rights.
" Lockhart, 476 US 162.
, Id at 174.
95 Id.
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cific cases. 6 Like the "Witherspoon excludables," the less educated
may be impaired in their ability to "conscientiously apply the law
and find the facts. ' 97 In many instances, they will be unable to
grasp fully the difficult concepts at issue in complex civil litigation.
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the
issue of whether the less educated form a cognizable group,98 lower
courts have held that individuals of lesser education are not suffi-
ciently "distinctive" to justify charges that the fair cross-section
requirement had been violated:
The less educated, like the young, are a diverse group,
lacking in distinctive characteristics or attitudes which
set them apart from the rest of society. They are of vary-
ing economic backgrounds, and races, and of many differ-
ent ages. We believe the interests of this group can be
adequately protected by the remainder of the populace. 9
In overturning its earlier ruling to the contrary, United States v
Butera,'00 the First Circuit noted that Butera "stands as a lonely
exception to the otherwise unanimous rule that the less educated
do not constitute a cognizable group."' ' 1
In fact, the federal Jury Selection and Service Act itself may
be interpreted to support the conclusion that the less educated are
not a cognizable group. In prohibiting discrimination, the Act
provides:
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in
the Court of International Trade on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.0 2
Exclusion based on education is not expressly forbidden by the
plain language of the statute. Under the canon of statutory con-
" Id at 175.
Id at 178, quoting Wainwright v Witt, 469 US 412, 423 (1985).
98 But see Carter v Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 US 320, 332 (1970), where
the Court recognized that the States remain free to confine jury selection "to persons meet-
ing specified qualifications of age and educational attainment."
Potter, 552 F2d at 905.
100 420 F2d 564 (lst Cir 1970).
101 Anaya v Hansen, 781 F2d 1, 8 (1st Cir 1986). See also United States v Kleifgen, 557
F2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir 1977); United States v Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F Supp 799, 804,
807 (SD Fla 1982); United States v Abell, 552 F Supp 316, 324 (D Me 1982); and Figueroa v
Puerto Rico, 463 F Supp 1212, 1214 (DPR 1979). See also United States v Henderson, 298
F2d 522, 526 (7th Cir 1962) (jury selection proceedings that tend to eliminate persons with
less than an eighth grade education found constitutional).
02 28 USC § 1862.
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struction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,0 3 the statute may
be interpreted to permit exclusion of the less educated from jury
service in complex cases.
2. The Significant State Interest in More Knowledgeable
Jurors.
Applying the Duren test to the less educated and noting this
group's similarity to the "Witherspoon excludables," the less edu-
cated may not be a cognizable group for purposes of the fair cross-
section requirement. However, even if the less educated are suffi-
ciently distinctive, a significant government interest would be
served by excluding this group from juries in complex civil
litigation.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a compelling state
interest may justify the exclusion of a particular group, but only if
a significant state interest be manifestly and primarily
advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process,
such as exemption criteria, that result in the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of a distinctive group.1 04
In complex civil litigation, there are at least two important state
interests that would be served by employing special juries: ensur-
ing competent fact-finding tribunals and maintaining public confi-
dence in the judicial system.
The state has a powerful interest in providing fair trials by
jurors who understand and can accurately apply the facts to the
law. The very purpose of trial by jury is to assure "[a] fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues."10 In selecting jurors with
relevant education or experience while passing over individuals
who may lack any generalized knowledge regarding the subjects at
issue in a complex trial, the state furthers this goal. The Second
Circuit has suggested that an attempt to form grand juries from
persons of above-average intelligence "might even be supported by
the state's compelling need ... for speedy and accurate decision-
making."' 0 6
103 "Mention of one thing implies exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 521
(West, 5th ed 1979).
I0' Duren, 439 US at 367-68. See also Taylor, 419 US at 534 ("The right to a proper
jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds. There must be weightier reasons if a
distinctive class . . . is for all practical purposes to be excluded from jury service.").
,05 Colgrove, 413 US at 157.
100 Cobbs, 528 F2d at 1336 (citation omitted).
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Somewhat related to the state's interest in promoting in-
formed and accurate decision-making is the state's need to pre-
serve the integrity of the judicial process. This is a concern of the
highest magnitude, and the Supreme Court has cited it in the con-
text of jury composition as well as in other areas.1"' If juries are
hopelessly confused by the issues and facts presented in a lengthy
complex trial, they cannot be expected to arrive at a just and accu-
rate result. By continuing to presume that typical juries are capa-
ble fact-finders in all complex litigation, the federal courts are un-
dermining their own integrity. Not only litigants, but the public at
large, will lose respect for the judicial system if that system insists
on supporting what must often be verdicts founded on
misunderstanding.
3. A Citizen's Right to Serve on a Jury.
The Jury Selection and Service Act declares that "all citizens
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand
and petit juries in the district courts of the United States."0 8 Al-
though the Act does list some exceptions to the general
rule-certain felons, individuals who cannot read, write, speak, or
understand English, and those incapable of rendering efficient ser-
vice because of mental or physical difficulties 109- higher education
is not a prerequisite for jury duty.
This does not, however, preclude the use of special juries in
particular cases. In Lockhart v McCree,110 the Supreme Court, in
explaining its approval of the removal for cause of "Witherspoon
excludables," indicated that there may be no right to serve on any
particular jury. The court remarked that removal for cause
does not prevent them from serving as jurors in other
criminal cases, and thus leads to no substantial depriva-
tion of their basic rights of citizenship."'
This same logic can be applied to potential jurors who may be un-
qualified to assess adequately the many intricate issues involved in
complex cases. Although excluded from jury service in one such
107 See, for example, Peters v Kiff, 407 US 493, 502 (1972); Rose v Mitchel, 443 US 545,
563 (1979) ("The claim that the court has discriminated on the basis of race in a given case
brings the integrity of the judicial system into direct question.").
loS 28 USC § 1861.
109 28 USC § 1865.
476 US 162.
.. Id at 176.
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case, an individual may be eligible to serve in less complicated
litigation.
Jury service in less complicated cases does not mean that per-
sons with lesser education would be eligible only for participation
in less important litigation. These individuals would still have the
opportunity to serve on juries facing many of the critical issues of
the day. Abortion, the drug war, school prayer, and flag desecration
are all current, divisive issues which presumably would not arise in
the context of a complex civil case, and which the less educated
would be able to adjudicate. These issues do not rely upon eco-
nomics, science or mathematics for resolution. In essence, they re-
quire value judgments, and the ability to make value judgments is
not a function of one's educational level.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that an individual's
right to a fair and impartial trial may justify limitations on the
rights of others." 2 Similarly, the right of adversaries in complex
civil litigation to a jury "suitable in character and intelligence for
that civic duty""' should override the objections of those elimi-
nated from the jury selection process because of a lack of educa-
tion or special experience. A litigant simply has more at stake in a
complex civil action. With few exceptions, a party will have only
one opportunity to present his case to a jury, the results of which
can have a tremendous and long-lasting impact on the party. A
potential juror, on the other hand, does not forfeit all right to fu-
ture jury service merely because he is not selected to serve on a
certain case; moreover, the impact of the eventual outcome of the
trial on the potential juror is minimal." 4
4. Amending the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act.
Even if the Supreme Court were to hold that special juries vio-
late the fair cross-section requirement of the federal Jury Selection
11 See, for example, Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333, 358 (1966), where the Court
asserted that restrictions on the First Amendment right to freedom of the press are justified
"when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged."
i Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 474 (1953).
"1 Consider Groppi v Wisconsin, 400 US 505 (1971), where the Court maintained that
a change of venue may be required as the only means of preserving a defendant's right to an
impartial jury. Id at 510. In such a case, an entire community is excluded from jury service
because "the community from which the jury is to be drawn may already be permeated with
hostility toward the defendant." Id. Note that these same community members would pre-
sumably still be eligible for jury service in other trials.
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and Service Act, the statute could be amended to eliminate the
requirement in complex civil litigation. 115
5. "Indirect" Discrimination.
The use of special juries also poses the threat that certain cog-
nizable groups will be disproportionately represented in the special
jury pool.116 For example, a smaller proportion of blacks attend
college than do whites. 17 Thus, if special jury selection criteria fo-
cused on college education, blacks would probably comprise a
smaller percentage of the resultant pool of prospective jurors than
actually represented in the community at large. This dispropor-
tionate exclusion of a recognized cognizable group would not be
deliberate, but would result as an unintended consequence of the
focus on education.
The Supreme Court has recognized this problem and upheld
this sort of "unintended discrimination" in the context of equal
protection jurisprudence. In Washington v Davis,"8 black appli-
cants to the police force failed a standard written personnel test at
a far greater rate than white applicants; thus, blacks were dispro-
portionately excluded from the police force. The Court held that
this result did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The per-
sonnel test was designed to measure the verbal skills of applicants
and, the Court concluded,
it is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Gov-
ernment from seeking modestly to upgrade the communi-
cative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied
with some lower level of competence, particularly where
the job requires special ability to communicate orally and
in writing." 9
In recognizing the government's right to assure itself of a capable
police force, the Court maintained that the Equal Protection
Clause was violated only where racial discrimination was the result
of a discriminatory purpose. 2 ° Acknowledging that disproportion-
"1 See Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 Yale L J
1155 (1980), which advocates such an amendment to provide for the use of special juries in
complex civil cases.
"" Luneburg & Nordenberg, 67 Va L Revat 950 (cited in note 7).
"7 National Center for Education Statistics, 24 Digest of Educational Statistics 174
(1988).
"8 426 US 229 (1976).
Id at 245-46.
Id at 240.
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ate impact may be an important factor in ascertaining discrimina-
tory intent, the Court nevertheless held that "it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. 121
In Batson v Kentucky, 22 the Supreme Court outlined the test
to determine whether a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges
unconstitutionally to discriminate against minorities. A defendant
must first make a prima facie showing of "purposeful discrimina-
tion," after which the prosecution can present a "neutral explana-
tion" for striking the minority jurors. 23 Potential jurors may share
characteristics in addition to race with the defendant. Courts gen-
erally have upheld peremptory challenges when prosecutors have
attested that their strikes were based not on race, but on these
other similarities. 24 Thus, a prosecutor accused of discriminating
against black potential jurors may rebut the charge by explaining
that his or her choice for exclusion was based not on race, but in-
stead on the fact that the jurors lived in the same or similar neigh-
borhoods as the defendant. 21
As was the case in Washington, and like the peremptory chal-
lenges which the Supreme Court validated in Batson, any dispro-
portionate exclusion of cognizable groups from a special jury selec-
tion pool should withstand an equal protection challenge, assuming
that education, and not race, is what determines selection for the
pool. 126 Education must be the relevant factor leading to exclusion;
any disproportionate exclusion of certain cognizable groups must
be merely an unintended consequence.127
Any discriminatory impact that special jury selection based on
education might have may be alleviated over time as the propor-
12 Id at 242.
122 476 US 79 (1986).
'8 Id at 96-97.
1 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory.
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 175 (1989).
"s See, for example, Taitano v Commonwealth, 4 Va App 342, 358 SE2d 590 (1987).
26 But see Alschuler, 56 U Chi L Rev at 163-211, for the argument that peremptory
challenges should be incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause even when they are not
based on race.
127 In the context of a Sixth Amendment challenge to a venire not designed to reflect a
fair cross-section of the community, see the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Holland v Illinois, 58 USLW 4162 (1990), in which the Court noted:
The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means
of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand),
but an impartial one (which it does).
Id at 4164 (emphasis in original).
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tion of minorities who attend college rises. ' In the meantime, se-
lection procedures could be employed that would aid jury commis-
sioners in ensuring proportionate representation in the special jury
pool. One approach might be to use questionnaires to obtain infor-
mation relating to a potential juror's race or other cognizable char-
acteristics.12 9 With this information, officials could create special
jury pools that still reflect a cross-section of the community.
III. INSTITUTING THE SPECIAL JURY IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Proposals for Special Jury Selection
Several alternatives are possible to implement a special jury
system for complex civil litigation and to attract jurors who are
more capable of dealing with these types of cases.
(1) The previous Delaware procedure for empaneling special
juries 1 0 is one option. Under this system, "a list of 48 indifferent
and judicious citizens"' 3' is made by the chief clerk or his deputy,
or by two indifferent persons appointed by the court. Beginning
with the party who requested the special jury, each side would al-
ternate in striking names from the list until 24 names remained.
These 24 persons would be summoned for jury service. The court
then would entertain the challenges of each side until a jury of
twelve was attained.
One problem inherent in the Delaware procedure' for special
jury selection is that it poses the danger of discriminatory selection
since much discretion is concentrated in a small number of court,
or court-appointed, officials." 2 This is a danger which may be
avoided by some of the other proposals described below.
The proportion of minorities on campus rose steadily through the 1970's. Luneburg
& Nordenberg, 67 Va L Rev at 949 n 355 (cited in note 7). Unfortunately, this trend was
reversed in the 1980s, largely as a result of cuts in federal college grants. Pat Wingert, Fewer
Blacks on Campus, Newsweek 75 (Jan 29, 1990) (reporting results of a study by the Ameri-
can .Council on Education). Changes in the federal budget to allow for more ready access to
educational aid may help to put minority enrollment back on the path it followed during the
1970s. Time may then eliminate the disparity between whites and other cognizable groups
on special jury panels.
,29 See Luneburg & Nordenberg, 67 Va L Rev at 949-50, for a fuller explanation of such
a procedure. See also text accompanying note 145.
SO 10 Del Code Ann §§ 4541-42 (1974) (repealed in 1987). The present empaneling stat-
ute gives considerable discretion to the trial courts in formulating a selection plan. 10 Del
Code Ann § 4507 (Supp 1988).
"' 10 Del Code Ann § 4541(b) (1974) (repealed in 1987).
132 See text accompanying notes'77-81.
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(2) Judge William Schwarzer has identified two possible mech-
anisms for selecting competent jurors in complex cases. '33 The first
method would permit each side to choose a specified number of
potential jurors after voir dire. Following the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges and challenges for cause, each attorney would se-
lect one-half of the required jurors from those remaining. In this
manner, any side that desired a more competent jury could ensure
that at least half of the jury was better educated or had more rele-
vant experience.134 At the same time, however, the other half of the
jury may be particularly unqualified for service. Nonetheless, a
half-competent jury is better than a wholly incompetent one.
Moreover, implementation of this proposal does not appear to in-
crease administrative costs significantly.
Judge Schwarzer's second proposal would permit the trial
judge to choose possible jurors after voir dire on the basis of their
education or experience. The judge would then work with counsel
to select the trial jury from those remaining.135 One drawback of
this plan is that it might meet with considerable opposition from
trial lawyers. It seems unlikely that litigators will quietly surrender
a large part of their traditional role in jury selection to the discre-
tion of the judge.
(3) Professors William Luneburg and Mark Nordenberg have
outlined a plan for special juries selected on the basis of objective
educational criteria.'36 Their plan requires that a separate special
jury wheel be maintained of prospective special jurors who have
"earned a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or univer-
sity. 1 37 Under this proposal, the trial court's decision to employ a
special jury would be subject to interlocutory appeal upon certifi-
cation by the district court and subsequent acceptance by the
court of appeals.' 38
This third method seems to be the easiest and least costly to
administer of the various alternatives described here. Yet, not sur-
prisingly, because of the bright-line test employed, it runs the risk
of being under-inclusive. Many individuals who have relevant work
experience or training outside of a college setting would be ex-
cluded from the special jury pool. The difficulties already inherent
"8 William W Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U Chi Legal F 119.
, See id at 126 for a more complete explanation of this proposal.
See id at 126-27.
Luneburg & Nordenberg, 67 Va L Rev at 942-50 (cited in note 7).
Id at 947.
138 Id at 943-44.
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in finding a sufficient number of persons able to serve on juries in
protracted litigation 139 make it desirable to keep the pool of poten-
tial special jurors as broad as possible.
(4) An alternative proposal from the Yale Law Journal "4
would require that, upon motion by either party to a complex civil
case, the judge would make an initial determination as to 1)
whether the case concerns issues "beyond the practical abilities
and limitations" '' of a typical jury, 2) whether the trial would be
unusually lengthy, and 3) whether unfairness or prejudice to either
party might result from the use of a special jury. 42 If the court
concluded that a special jury would be appropriate, the court
would proceed with jury selection in one of two ways. First, a ques-
tionnaire designed to identify the individuals most likely to com-
prehend the issues in a particular complex case might be sent to
persons selected at random from the master jury wheel. Only those
judged particularly competent would be summoned, and final se-
lection of jurors would then proceed from the panel so sum-
moned.4 The second possibility provides for a panel of possible
jurors selected by a committee of three: each side in the litigation
would choose one representative, and those representatives would
choose a neutral third member. The court would examine the jury
panel to ensure that there had been no purposeful discrimination
in the method of selection. Once the court established the absence
of discrimination or other improper criteria, the trial jury would be
chosen under established federal jury selection procedures. 44
The first alternative proposed by the Yale Law Journal main-
tains a more broadly based pool of potential jurors, since those
with relevant work experience or training could be identified
through the questionnaires. At the same time, this proposal could
help insure a more representative special jury. The questionnaires
could presumably be employed to obtain information regarding
any cognizable characteristics of potential special jurors.' 5 These
benefits may outweigh the increased administrative costs of evalu-
"3 See text accompanying notes 13-22.
140 Note, 89 Yale L J 1155 (cited in note 115).
Although the language is drawn from Ross, 396 US at 538 n 10, use of this test does
not rely on a constitutionally sanctioned complexity exception. See section II.A.2 of this
Comment.
"42 See Note, 89 Yale L J at 1172-74, for an explanation of the rationale for these three
qualifications.
"I See id at 1174-75 for a more detailed explanation of such a system.
',4 For a more complete sketch of this procedure, see id at 1175-76.
141 Id at 1175. See also text accompanying note 129.
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ating numerous questionnaires. 46 The second proposal, however, is
more problematic. Like the Delaware procedure, there is a poten-
tial for abuse in the selection of jurors, despite the provision for
additional scrutiny by the trial judge.",7
B. Additional Suggestions
In addition to the detailed proposals for implementing special
juries noted above, there are several more modest suggestions
which may help to attract jurors who are more competent to serve
on complex cases. One commentator has observed that
"[i]mproving the quality of jurors could be effectuated. by increas-
ing the amenities associated with jury service, such as fees, park-
ing, and other civil privileges." 48 Making the role of the jury more
active in the courtroom would presumably make jury duty more
intellectually stimulating and may thus entice more people to par-
ticipate. 149 Granting lifetime exemptions from future jury service
to those individuals who serve during protracted trials may operate
as a further inducement. 150
In light of the financial hardships that jurors in a lengthy com-
plex case might face,"' adequate compensation for jury service
may be the most effective means of attracting better educated and
more experienced jurors. Requiring employers to compensate em-
ployees fully for all days spent on jury duty may substantially
eliminate the financial concerns troubling prospective jurors faced
by a potentially lengthy trial. Another alternative would shift the
burden of payment not to employers, but to the parties in the liti-
gation.' After a specified "reasonable" period of service, juror fees
could be dramatically increased for the remaining days of trial,
with costs to be borne by the litigants.5 3 If state and federal gov-
ernments granted non-taxable status to these increased fees, juror
14' Note, 89 Yale L J at 1175. Potential federal jurors already fill out a "juror qualifica-
tion form," 28 USC § 1865, so for purposes of special jury selection, the relevant questions
could simply be added to this same form.
117 Note, 89 Yale L J at 1176.
14' Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 NC L Rev 481, 514 (1987).
149 Id.
180 See Lempert, 80 Mich L Rev at 118 (cited in note 52).
151 See text accompanying note 18.
12 Lempert, 80 Mich L Rev at 118-19.
"' Id. But.see Note, 89 Yale L J at 1175 n 125 (cited in note 115) ("[Tlhis path should
be discouraged. Access to special juries ought not to depend on the litigant's ability to pay
for the privilege.").
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compensation would appear even more attractive, particularly to
those in higher income brackets.""
CONCLUSION
The rational resolution of today's complex civil litigation
places unusual demands on jurors. Many jurors are simply incapa-
ble of meeting these demands. Yet, the federal courts must en-
deavor to assure litigants that their problems will be adjudicated
by competent factfinders. Chosen for their education or special ex-
perience as it relates to the subject matter at issue, special juries
can help supply such assurance. The use of special juries is consis-
tent with both the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and the
Jury Selection and Service Act, and can be structured so as to
overcome challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause and the
fair cross-section requirement. Through a fair and effective selec-
tion plan, special juries would be able to promote the due process
guarantee that parties will be heard by "ajury capable and willing
to decide the case solely on the evidence before it."' 8
154 Lempert, 80 Mich L Rev at 118.
" Smith v Phillips, 455 US at 217.
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